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I. INTRODUCTION
A rent-seeking contest is a situation in which players compete with one another by expending outlays to win a rent. Examples abound. When a positive monopoly rent is secured under government protection, firms lobby to win the monopoly. When governmental decisions to establish tariffs or other trade barriers create rents, firms compete to capture these rents. Firms compete to acquire a rent generated by rights of ownership to an import quota. Firms compete to obtain a rent generated by a government procurement contract.
Beginning with the seminal work of Tullock (1967) , the early literature on rent seeking has concentrated on individual rent seeking that is, contests in which players  compete individually to win the rent. This includes, for example, Krueger (1974 ), Posner (1975 , Tullock (1980) , Hillman and Katz (1984) , Appelbaum and Katz (1987) , Hillman and Riley (1989) , Hirshleifer (1989) , Leininger (1993) , and Hurley and Shogren (1998) . 1 Recently, several economists have studied collective rent seeking that is, contests  in which competition for the rent arises among groups of players and the rent is awarded to a group. For example, Nitzan (1991a Nitzan ( , 1991b , Baik and Shogren (1995) , Lee (1995) , Hausken (1995) , and Baik and Lee (1997) study collective rent seeking with a privategood rent. Katz et al. (1990) , Ursprung (1990) , Baik (1993) , Riaz et al. (1995) , Katz and Tokatlidu (1996) , and Baik et al. (2001) study collective rent seeking with a group-specific public-good rent. A salient feature of the rent-seeking contests in these articles is that the players expend their outlays noncooperatively.
This article studies individual rent seeking with a private-good rent. But unlike the previous work, we consider a rent-seeking contest with endogenous group formation in which players can form groups before they expend their outlays. What type of groups do 2 we consider? As we will explain it in section II, if a group is formed and then a player in that group wins the rent, the winner "shares" it with the other players in that group.
Examples of such groups may include coalitions among firms, political parties, or interest groups, and R&D joint ventures among firms. This article focuses on the profitability of endogenous group formation and the effect of such group formation on rent dissipation.
Specifically, we consider a three-stage game in which the players first decide whether to form groups, then the players in each group decide how to share the rent if "they" win it, and finally all the players in the contest expend their outlays independently to win the rent.
The rent is awarded to a player. single Why do players form such groups? An intuitive explanation is that each player wants to insure against his failure in winning the rent in other words, he wants to share  the risk of his failure with the other players in his group. Or, as it will be clear in section II, each player wants to make his prize bigger in case he becomes the winner. Another explanation is that they can benefit by achieving strategic commitments through such group formation: They can change their opponents' behavior in their favor by using their sharing rule and treating members differently from nonmembers. To highlight the idea of strategic group formation, we call groups formed herein . We define a strategic groups 3 strategic group as follows: (a) the players in each group first choose their sharing rule winner's fractional share and then expend their outlays noncooperatively; and (b)   if a player in a group wins the rent, the winner "shares" the rent with the other players in that group according to the predetermined sharing rule. The players in a strategic group do not need to know how much outlays their group members expended, when they share the rent.
This article endogenizes the number of strategic groups, their sizes, and their sharing rules. Defining an equilibrium as a situation in which no payoff-increasing individual move-in or move-out is possible, we obtain the number of strategic groups and their sizes in equilibrium. Given the number of players, the equilibrium number of strategic groups is not unique. When just one strategic group is formed in equilibrium, there may be players who do not belong to the single strategic group and, for more than five players, the equilibrium group size equals the smallest of integers greater than half the 3 number of players. When more than one strategic group is formed in equilibrium, every player belongs to one of the groups and the difference in equilibrium group size between any two groups is at most one. Equilibrium winner's fractional share is less than one when just one strategic group is formed, and is greater than one the winner takes all the rent  and further receives "bounties" from the other players in his group for all the strategic  groups when more than two strategic groups are formed.
Examining the extent of rent dissipation is one of the main issues in the literature on rent seeking. It is important because the opportunity costs of resources expended on rent-seeking activities are social costs and thus create economic inefficiency. Examining the profitability of endogenous group formation and the effect of such group formation on rent dissipation, we show the following. When just one strategic group is formed in equilibrium, group formation is beneficial both to the group members and to the nonmembers, and rent dissipation (or total outlay) is smaller than with usual individual rent seeking that is, the social cost associated with rent seeking decreases by such group  formation. However, when more than two strategic groups are formed in equilibrium, group formation is never profitable to any players and rent dissipation is greater than with individual rent seeking. We also show that total rent-seeking outlay is less than the rent, regardless of the number of strategic groups formed.
This article is related to the literature on the noncooperative theory of endogenous formation of coalitions the literature which deals with situations in which players first  form coalitions and then, given the coalition structure determined, engage in noncooperative competition. Papers in this literature include Bloch (1995 , 1996 ), Yi (1996 , 1997 , Konishi et al. (1997) , Belleflamme (2000) , Yi and Shin (2000) , and Morasch (2000) . They concentrate on examining the equilibrium (or stable) structures of coalitions the equilibrium numbers and the sizes of coalitions in models with various   applications. Bloch (1995) , Yi (1998) , Belleflamme (2000) , and Yi and Shin (2000) examine the equilibrium structures of associations (such as R&D joint ventures) in 4 oligopolies. Yi (1996) examines the equilibrium structure of customs unions in a situation in which countries can form customs unions freely. Morasch (2000) obtains the equilibrium structures of strategic alliances of firms and, using them, examines the loose competition policy toward strategic alliances as an alternative to the strategic trade policy.
One main finding of these articles is that the grand coalition is typically not an equilibrium coalition structure, with the exception that, in the case where coalition formation among symmetric players creates negative externalities for nonmembers, the grand coalition is an equilibrium coalition structure under the open membership rule the rule that stipulates  that a coalition admit new members on a nondiscriminatory basis. We obtain a similar result in this article: The grand coalition never occurs if the number of players exceeds five.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In section II, we develop the model and set up the three-stage game. In section III, we solve a subgame that starts at the second stage of the three-stage game. In this subgame, given the number of groups and their sizes, the players in groups choose their winner's fractional shares and then all the players in the contest expend their outlays.
In section IV, we analyze the first stage of our three-stage game and thereby obtain the equilibrium numbers of strategic groups and equilibrium group sizes. In section V, we compute the equilibrium winner's fractional shares of the groups and examine the profitability of endogenous group formation and the effect of such group formation on rent dissipation. Finally, section VI offers our conclusions.
II. THE MODEL
There are risk-neutral players who want to win a fixed rent, where 1. The n n  rent is worth and will be awarded to one of the players. The probability that a player V wins the rent is equal to his outlay divided by the players' total outlay if the total outlay is positive, and it is equal to 1/ if all the players expend zero. n
The players can form groups before they compete by expending outlays. Groups formed are called strategic groups. We define a strategic group as follows. Suppose that a group consists of players, where is an integer and 1 . The players write an m m m n m  Ÿ agreement. The agreement specifies how much of the rent the winner and the losers each will take, when a player in the group wins the rent. Then all the players in the contest expend their outlays noncooperatively. If a player in that group wins the rent, the winner "shares" it with the other players in that group according to the previously written agreement. We assume that the winning player takes and each losing player "takes" 5V
(1 ) /( 1). The winner's fractional share, , is assumed to be greater than or equal  5 5 V m  to 1/ . If 1/ holds, the players in that group share the rent equally when a player in m m 5 oe that group wins it. In the case where 1/ 1, the winner helps the other players in m Ÿ  5 that group, and thus the prize to the winner is less than the rent. When the winner's fractional share is equal to unity, the winner takes all the rent. In the case where 1, 5  the winner takes all the rent and further receives "bounties" from the other players in that group. Thus, in this case, the prize to the winner is greater than the rent. We assume that there is no transaction cost associated with organizing a strategic group, negotiating an agreement, and enforcing compliance.
We formally consider the following three-stage game. In the first stage, the players decide simultaneously and independently whether to form strategic groups. In the second 5 stage, after knowing the number of groups and their sizes, the players in each group make a binding agreement that specifies how much of the rent the winner and the losers each will take when a player in the group wins the rent. In doing so, the players in each group set their winner's fractional share. Then all the groups announce their choices simultaneously. Note that, because the players in each group are identical, their decision on their winner's fractional share is unanimous. In the third stage, after knowing the number of groups, their sizes, and their winner's fractional shares, all the players in the contest choose their outlays simultaneously and independently. At the end of the third 6 stage, the winning player is chosen, and the winner "shares" the rent with the other players in his group according to the agreement written in the second stage. We assume that all of this is common knowledge. We employ subgame-perfect equilibrium as the solution concept. winner's fractional shares, player in group seeks to maximize his expected payoff: j i
III. EXPECTED PAYOFFS FOR THE PLAYERS GIVEN STRATEGIC GROUPS
where . In the payoff functions, / is the probability that player in group
wins the rent, ( )/ is the probability that any one of the other players in group wins X x S i i ij  the rent, and ( )/ is the probability that any one of the other groups' players wins the S X S  i rent. Note that given 0, the probability that a player wins the rent depends only on his S  own outlay.
Given a positive outlay of the other players, the first-order condition for
The second-order condition is satisfied. At the Nash equilibrium of the third-stage subgame, the players in the same group expend the same outlay. 
. We have then (4) into (3), we obtain the outlay of each player in group at the i third-stage Nash equilibrium:
) represent the expected payoff for each player in group at the third-stage
Nash equilibrium. Then, using (1), we obtain
Substituting (4) and (5) into equation (6), we obtain identical, the winner's fractional share that is "optimal" for a player is also optimal for the other players in the group. This implies that group 's decision on its winner's fractional i share is unanimous. In this stage, the players in group know that 1 and have i 5 N+1 oe perfect foresight about the third-stage competition. Given winner's fractional shares of the other groups, the best response of group is the winner's fractional share that maximizes i 1 5
From the first-order condition for maximizing (7), we
It is easy to see that ( ) is strictly concave in and thus the second-order condition 1 5 share which is specified in the subgame-perfect equilibrium. From the above equations N and the fact that 1, we obtain group s equilibrium winner's fractional share ( ). 5 5
In the case where m n, group i's equilibrium winner's fractional share is 1 
The winner's fractional share of group N is defined above as equal to unity  1 .
Using Lemma 2, we find the following. First, group 's equilibrium winner's i fractional share is greater than 1/ (in this paragraph, 1 ). This can be explained m i , ... , N i oe as follows. Equal sharing brings a serious free-rider problem and fails to induce group s i' players to expend "optimal" outlays. Therefore, facing the rival groups, the players in group adopt a "sharing" rule which allows the winner to take more than the equal share. 
Using Lemma 3, we obtain the following. Finally, the equilibrium total outlay is less than the rent. Other things being equal, as the number of groups, the number of players in the contest, or increases, the equilibrium m N1 total outlay increases.
Next, using equation (7), Lemmas 1 and 2, and the fact that 1, we obtain 5 N+1 oe Lemma 4, which describes each player's expected payoff in the subgame-perfect equilibrium. 
IV. EQUILIBRIUM NUMBERS OF STRATEGIC GROUPS AND EQUILIBRIUM GROUP SIZES
We analyzed the second and the third stages of our three-stage game in section III.
We now consider the first stage in which the players decide simultaneously and and , using Lemma 4 and the fact that in equilibrium no player has an incentive to deviate individually from his "position" that is, no payoff-increasing individual move-in  or move-out is possible. Given , the equilibrium number of strategic groups is not n unique. We obtain first the equilibrium group sizes when 1, which are summarized N * oe in Lemma 5 and belong to the single strategic group. This occurs because, in the case where just one strategic group is formed, if the size of the single group is greater (less) than half the number of players, then the expected payoff for each member is less (greater) than that for each nonmember (see Lemma 4). Note that, for 6, the equilibrium group size equals n the smallest of integers greater than half the number of players. This means that, as the number of players increases, the number of nonmembers weakly increases. Recall from Lemma 1 that the grand coalition eliminates the inefficiency problem associated with rent seeking. This and Lemma 5 tell us that, when 4, the inefficiency problem of rent n Ÿ seeking can be eliminated by endogenous strategic-group formation. Using Lemma 6, one can easily obtain the equilibrium group sizes when 6. It N * is easy to see that, given 2, the equilibrium size of group is weakly increasing in the N i * number of players. Table 2 shows the equilibrium group sizes for 15, when n Ÿ 2 5 . Ÿ Ÿ N * In the literature on endogenous coalition formation, it is common to obtain the equilibrium coalition structures involving multiple coalitions (see, for example, Bloch, 1995; Yi, 1997 Yi, , 1998 and Yi and Shin, 2000) . Morasch (2000) (i) the expected payoff for each player in groups 2 through is always greater than that for N a player who does not belong to a strategic group, and (ii) the players in a smaller group have greater equilibrium expected payoffs than those in a larger one. The former tells us that a nonmember can increase his expected payoff by joining one of those groups. The latter fact tells us that, if the difference in group size between any two groups is greater than one, then a player in a larger group can increase his expected payoff by switching his 
V. WINNER'S FRACTIONAL SHARES, EXPECTED PAYOFFS, AND RENT DISSIPATION
We begin by computing the groups' equilibrium winner's fractional shares of our three-stage game. Using Lemmas 1, 2, 5, 6, and 7, we obtain Proposition 2. In the case where just one strategic group is formed in equilibrium, if a player in the group wins the rent, the winner helps the losers in the group and thus the prize to the winner is less than the rent. This confirms our explanation in section I that one motive of group formation is that players want to insure against their failure in winning the rent. Part (b) says that when two strategic groups are formed and is even, the winner takes all the n rent. Part (c) says that when more than two strategic groups are formed in equilibrium, the winner takes all the rent and further receives "bounties" from the other players in his group. Thus, in this case, the prize to the winner is greater than the rent.
Why do group members write an agreement that if a player in their group wins the rent, the other members in the group pay "bounties" to the winner? One reason is that they can achieve strategic commitments: They can change their opponents' behavior in their favor by using such a "sharing" rule. Another and more convincing reason is that they each as the potential beneficiary can be motivated to exert more effort and thus can be   more aggressive in the outlays-expending stage because the "sharing" rule makes the winner's prize bigger. In short, each group member agrees to pay "bounties" to increase his own expected payoff. Indeed, each group member supports himself by promising to support the winning member.
An explanation for part (c) is then: competing against the members in the other groups who are more aggressive than individual players, the members in each group make themselves more aggressive by setting their winner's fractional share greater than one.
Next, using Lemmas 4 through 7, we compute the equilibrium expected payoffs for the players, and compare them with the players' expected payoffs resulting from usual individual rent seeking. Note that each player's expected payoff resulting from individual rent seeking, denoted by ( ), is / (see note 4). We obtain Proposition 3. two strategic groups are formed in equilibrium, group formation is never profitable to any players. The intuitive explanations for these follow. When one strategic group is formed, only the group members move before the outlays-expending stage by announcing their sharing rule. According to the sharing rule, if a player in the group wins the rent, the winner must help the losers in the group. The exclusive move and rent sharing mitigate the competition among the players in the following outlays-expending stage, and thus enables the group members to increase their expected payoffs, as compared with those earned in the case of individual rent seeking. Interestingly, the nonmembers also benefit by that exclusive move. By contrast, when more than two strategic groups are formed, 11 the groups announce their sharing rules simultaneously. And, according to each sharing rule, a winner takes all the rent and further receives "bounties" from the other players in his group. These simultaneous moves and the prize bigger than the rent lead to an intense competition, and thus the players' expected payoffs decrease as compared with individual rent seeking. Yi (1996) examines the welfare effects of endogenous formation of customs unions on member and nonmember countries. He shows that formation of customs unions improves the aggregate welfare of member countries but reduces the welfare of nonmember countries. He also shows that, in any customs-union structure, a member of a large union has a higher level of welfare than a member of a small union. Morasch (2000) shows in the linear Cournot model that, in the case where only national alliances are possible, the members of a smaller alliance earn higher profits because they are more aggressive in the output market. To compare these results with ours, recall the result in Lemma 4 that the players in a smaller group have greater equilibrium expected payoffs than those in a larger one.
Finally, using Lemmas 1, 3, 5, 6, and 7, we compute the equilibrium outlays of the individual players and the equilibrium total outlay, and compare them with the individual outlays and total outlay resulting from usual individual rent seeking. Note that each player's outlay and the total outlay resulting from individual rent seeking, denoted by ( ) x IR and ( ), are ( 1) Proposition 4 says that, in the case where just one strategic group is formed in equilibrium, rent dissipation (or total outlay) is smaller than with individual rent seeking that is, the social cost associated with rent seeking decreases by such group  formation. However, in the case where more than two strategic groups are formed in equilibrium, rent dissipation is greater than with individual rent seeking. This result that group formation increases rent dissipation compared with individual rent seeking, is new in the literature on rent seeking. Baik (1994) shows in a model similar to ours that group formation always decreases rent dissipation compared with individual rent seeking. The main reason why we obtain the different result is that the winner's fractional share can be greater than unity in this article but cannot be so in Baik (1994) . Proposition 4 also implies that the equilibrium total outlay is less than the rent, , regardless of the number of V strategic groups formed. This establishes that less than complete dissipation of the contested rent occurs when the players endogenously form strategic groups.
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Using Lemmas 3 and 6, we obtain that, when 2, the equilibrium total outlay N * increase in the number of players is accompanied by a decrease in the equilibrium number of strategic groups.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have considered a rent-seeking contest in which players can form strategic groups before they expend their outlays. After obtaining the equilibrium numbers of strategic groups and equilibrium group sizes, we have examined the profitability of endogenous group formation and the effect of such group formation on rent dissipation.
We have found the following. When just one strategic group is formed in equilibrium, group formation is beneficial both to the group members and to the nonmembers, and rent dissipation is smaller than with usual individual rent seeking. However, when more than two strategic groups are formed in equilibrium, group formation is never profitable to any players and rent dissipation is greater than with individual rent seeking. Finally, total rentseeking outlay is less than the rent, regardless of the number of strategic groups formed.
We have shown in section IV that, when the number of players does not exceed five, the grand coalition occurs and, therefore, the inefficiency problem associated with rent seeking disappears.
In section IV, to obtain the equilibrium numbers of strategic groups and equilibrium group sizes, we have checked only whether a player has an incentive to deviate individually from his position. This means that our notion of equilibrium does not rule out the possibility of profitable coalitional-deviations from an equilibrium. That is, in an equilibrium, no player has an incentive to deviate individually, but coalitions of players may have incentives to deviate collectively. Hence, if we use an equilibrium concept that 22 takes into account coalitional deviations also, we may obtain fewer equilibria than we have in section IV. Indeed, we can refine the "Nash equilibrium set" obtained in section IV we can obtain sharper predictions about the equilibrium numbers of strategic groups  and equilibrium group sizes by using the concept of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium  introduced by Bernheim et al. (1987) . However, our main results in section V remain 14 unchanged since the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium set is merely a subset of the Nash equilibrium set.
1. Nitzan (1994) provides an excellent survey of the literature on rent seeking.
2. Baik (1994) and Baik and Shogren (1995) formally study group formation. But the number of groups formed is exogenously restricted to unity. By contrast, we endogenize the number of groups formed.
3.
To highlight the first motive to form such groups, one may wish to call them something different, say, support groups.
4.
This simplest logit-form probability-of-winning function (also called contest success function) is extensively used in the literature on rent seeking. Examples include Tullock (1980) , Appelbaum and Katz (1987) , Riley (1989), Hirshleifer (1989) , Katz et al. (1990) , Ursprung (1990) , Nitzan (1991a Nitzan ( , 1991b , Leininger (1993) , Baik (1994) , Baik and Shogren (1995) , Lee (1995) , and Che and Gale (1997) . For other forms of probability of winning functions, see Baik (1998) and Baik et al. (2001) .
Consider the case in which the players compete individually to win the rent.
Assume that the players choose their outlays simultaneously. Then, at the Nash equilibrium, each player's expected payoff is / each player's outlay is ( 1)/ , and V n , V n n 2 2  the players' total outlay is ( 1)/ (see Baik, 1994) . We will use these values as the V n n  comparative benchmarks when we examine the effects of endogenous group formation on each player's expected payoff, each player's outlay, and the players' total outlay.
5.
Imagine the following procedure. Each player throws his name tag into one of n jars. The players who do not want to form a strategic group should throw their names in one particular jar, say, the th jar. The players who throw their names in the same jar n (other than the th one) will form a strategic group. If the th jar contains only one name, n j then the player forms a strategic group with, say, the th jar players. In order not to have a k trivial equilibrium in which no strategic group is formed, we assume that one player throws his name in a jar (other than the th one) before the other players choose their jars. 
8.
The proofs of Lemmas 5, 6, and 7 are straightforward and therefore omitted.
9. The proofs of Propositions 2, 3, and 4 are straightforward and therefore omitted.
10. Yi (1997) states that research-coalition formation in oligopolies and customs-union formation in international markets each create negative externalities for nonmembers, whereas formation of output cartels in oligopolies and formation of coalitions to provide public goods each create positive externalities.
11.
It follows immediately from Lemmas 4 and 5 that each group member's expected payoff is less than each nonmember's.
12.
Many economists obtain the underdissipation-of-rents result. Examples include Tullock (1980) , Hillman and Katz (1984) , Hillman and Riley (1989) , Katz et al. (1990) , Ursprung (1990) , Guttman et al. (1992) , Baik (1994) , and Baik and Shogren (1995) .
13. Nitzan (1991b) also obtains this result.
14. The coalition-proof Nash equilibrium set may be empty. Yi and Shin (2000) obtain stable structures of research joint ventures, using the concept of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium.
TABLE 1
The Equilibrium Group Sizes When 1 N * oe
